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Summary: This research conducted at Nordic-owned Russian factories asserts that foreign 
managements have certain latitude to choose their leadership style, although the post-Soviet 
context, factory size and the scale of investment (small-scale vs. large-scale) set constraints 
for HR management. The sample consists of seven factories, the number of employees of 
which ranges from 30 to 1200. It is observed that especially in case of acquisitions or 
brownfield investments; the Soviet organizational ‘imprint’ plays a decisive role as regards 
managerial orientation towards either ‘innovative’ leadership or ‘bureaucratic’ management. 
In factories having Soviet background (in terms of human resources or location) and of a 
larger size, a Nordic-type ‘incorporation participation’ or Soviet-style ‘welfare participation’ 
model was more likely to be applied, but more or less bureaucratic management prevails. On 
the other hand, at smaller workshops, there was a peril that innovative leadership turns out to 
resemble Soviet-type paternalism. There was neither pure occurrence of innovative leadership 
nor bureaucratic management among the case studies, which leads to a conclusion that the 
style adopted by Nordic managements is a hybrid of both innovative and bureaucratic styles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The term innovative leadership comes from V.I. Maslov’s (2010) view of the desirable 
developmental direction of Russian management where there is a threat that the Russian 
production machinery will undergo stagnation. There is the spectre of the return to 
‘bureaucratic’ Soviet production model. To achieve higher productivity, the Russian 
authorities focus besides on necessary technical/economic changes also on the social aspect of 
politics of innovation. In 2008, the Russian government approved the Conception of Social-
Economic Development until 2010, where emphasis is put on the transition to “innovative 
socially oriented type of economic development” (Ustinkin and Samsonov, 2010). Therefore 
the heuristic concept of ‘innovative leadership’ refers to the desirable outcome of 
management in order to maintain and enhance productivity in the framework of a national 
system of innovation (on the concept, see Freeman 1995). 
When attempting to achieve such goals of politics of innovation by means of enterprise-level 
management, one has to has to consider the relationship between business strategy and human 
resource management (HRM). This is what the concept of strategic HRM stands for. Roughly 
said, strategic HRM means that management of human resources is aligned to the business 
objectives of the firm (Boxall and Purcell, 2003, p. 47). Strategic management is also related 
to employee involvement and participation in decision-making in the company. According to 
Croucher, Gooderham and Parry (2006), “…strategic HRM aims to achieve strategically 
anchored employee involvement through High Involvement Management (HIM) techniques”. 
Among other features, direct communication practices are seen as one of the key 
characteristics of HIM (ibid.). 
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If we consider strategic HRM, we are in fact talking about a following triangle:   
 
Figure 1: The alignment of business strategy and HRM 
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Source: Maslov 2010 
 
According to Maslov (2010), contemporary Russian work organizations are based on 
bureaucratic, even military models of management, which prevents innovation from 
blossoming. Such a bureaucracy also obstructs the management the access to tacit and 
realistic information, traditionally only in possession of the employees, about the internal 
situation of the company. Maslov (ibid.) argues that Russian strategic HRM should be more 
oriented towards teasing out innovations especially in such strategically important sectors as 
biotechnology, communications, space applications and artificially intelligent systems. He 
also underscores the resolving of problems of innovation at all levels of the enterprise by 
means of employee involvement. The most feasible way to complete this task is to focus on 
human capital and the development of ‘participative’ management. Accordingly, in this paper, 
we propose an ideal-type distinction between two types of leadership-management: an 
‘innovative’ leadership approach and ‘bureaucratic’ management approach to HRM. While a 
traditional firm seeks to do things bigger and better, an innovative firm seeks to do new and 
different things.  
Maslov (ibid.) defines the traditional ‘technocratic’ corporate culture in terms of hierarchic, 
rigid subordination, the prevalence of regulated, executive behaviour, rational-economic 
motivation and narrow specialization of administrative bodies and functionaries. In contrast to 
technocracy, innovative leadership pursues for horizontal relationships, orientation to the 
employee, stimuli through final results and mutually defined goals. Pretty much along the 
same lines, Pardey (2007, p. 209) enumerates open communications, reward systems (not 
necessarily financial ones), individual autonomy and the role model of senior managers as 
mechanisms to put creative solutions to problems into action. Although Maslov (2010) has 
mainly had ‘intelligent’ work in mind while sketching out his innovative leadership model, 
the concept is here extended to HRM in all sectors, since it also coincides with Nordic 
leadership styles. 
 
2. NORDIC LEADERSHIP STYLES AND PARTICIPATORY SCHEMES 
 
The ‘Nordic cluster’ consisting of Denmark, Finland and Sweden constitutes or a distinctive 
entity in terms of Global Culturally Endorsed Implicit Leadership (CLT) dimensions 
(Dorfman, Hanges and Brodbeck, 2004, p. 690), where the effective Nordic leadership style 
exhibits high levels of Charismatic/Value-Based leadership, Team Oriented leadership and a 
considerable level of Participative leadership. By contrast, the scores of Humane-Oriented and 
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Self-Protective leadership are low (ibid.). There is considerable tolerance of Autonomous 
leadership in the Nordic societies (Chhokar, Bordbeck and House, 2007, p. 31). However, 
there are some differences in how Human Oriented leadership is enacted: personal sensitivity 
and development support are seen the main means of achieving Human Oriented leadership in 
Finland, whereas in Sweden, it is the egalitarian emphasis through which individual autonomy 
is approached and thus Human Oriented leadership achieved (ibid.). 
The issues of leadership and employee participation are intertwined. In the case of 
organisational change, especially direct forms of participation can play a key role in ensuring 
acceptance of change and in creating the conditions for employees to make effective 
contributions to their organisations (O’Brien, 2002). Russian enterprises have undergone an 
enormous change from state socialism to capitalism. However, there has not been a “normal” 
organisational change as regards Russian work organisations: autarkic top-down methods 
characteristic of the Soviet era must have been replaced by more “soft” management styles 
encountered more often in democratic societies. Here, the Nordic firms have a key role to play 
– to introduce more “empowering” leadership into the Russian subsidiaries. Once a true 
model transfer occurs from the Nordic to Baltic countries, subsidiaries are involved in the 
incorporation participation, that is, incorporation of the trade union (or representative 
structures in general) in the long-term strategy of the firm in circumstances where a tight 
labour market is accompanied with a competitive product market (Ackers, Marchington, 
Wilkinson and Goodman, 1992). 
For Nordic management, starting production in the post-Soviet countries poses challenges for 
getting rid of “management Sovieticus” (Liuhto, 1993) and the legitimation of the state-of-
the-art management of the new era. It is argued that the Soviet management was corrupt and 
ineffective compared to that of the market economy, and the whole idea of management 
required renewal. The transfer from socialist enterprise management to capitalist one has been 
occurring gradually. In place of production focus, characterised by little interest in financial 
and personnel functions, in post-Soviet enterprises attention had to be paid to sales, supply 
and finance (see Clarke, 2004).  
It is hypothesized that the Soviet model of employee participation resembles welfare 
participation (Knudsen 1995, 11), where employee participation in decision-making concerns 
mainly welfare issues. Such issues are company-specific welfare arrangements, canteen 
facilities, housing facilities, sports and other recreational activities, scholarships, and other 
forms of financial support different from the ordinary remuneration (ibid.). In other words, if 
this form of employee participation is not accompanied by any other form (in strategic, 
tactical or operational issues), employee involvement is rather narrow in scope. However, 
welfare participation corresponds pretty well to the functions of a state socialist trade union 
that served rather as a distributor and administrator of social insurance, social facilities and 
commodities for workers (see e.g. Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993, p. 94).  
An analysis of Nordic-owned metalworking, food processing and construction material 
factories in the Baltic States (Sippola, 2010) exhibits a wide variety of approaches to coping 
with the complex management tasks in the post-socialist context with little reference to 
‘Nordic-type’ consultation, co-operation and delegation of decisions with subordinates, 
analogous of consideration leadership behaviour. The subsidiaries having a carry over of 
employment practices from the Soviet time are more likely to be involved in Nordic-type 
‘incorporation participation’ (utilising indirect participation). The lack of indirect 
participation at the greenfield factories is to some extent compensated by market, HRM or 
task participation forms. Correspondingly, the Nordic managers seemingly prioritise business 
objectives at the expense of employee participation, while the leadership style adopted at the 
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Baltic subsidiaries reflects ‘initiating structure’ type of leadership rather than consideration 
leadership behaviour. 
 
3. DATA 
 
All the case study companies are located in the western part of Russia. The fieldwork was 
carried out in 2011. There were two Danish, three Finnish, one Norwegian and one Swedish 
company in the sample. Basic information of these subsidiaries is seen in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Basic information on the enterprises researched 
 Stroy-material Derevo Himstroy 
Agro-
tehnika Mashina Stal Provod 
sector construction material 
construction 
material 
construction 
material metal metal metal metal 
market 
orientation local market Europe local market
local 
(FSU) 
market 
local 
market 
local 
market Europe 
mode of 
entry brown-field
joint 
venture → 
acquisition 
greenfield/ 
acquisition 
brown-
field 
brown-
field 
brown-
field brown-field
established 
/ acquired mid 1990s 1990 1995/1996 2005 2002 1993 1992 
scale of 
investment large large large small 
small (in 
the current 
premises) 
small large 
workers 500 600 
250 (unit 1) 
/ 600 (unit 
2) 
40 70 70 900 
union 
members 130 350 150 - - - almost 400
trade 
union or 
other 
represen-
tation 
trade union trade union trade union - - 
elected 
EICF* 
represent
ative 
TU (chair-
person, 
vice chair + 
committee)
collective 
agreement yes yes no no no no yes 
* European Information and Consultation Forum (the company’s own) 
 
Himstroy consists of two different production units within the boundaries of one of the 
biggest cities in Russia. Unit 1 has been established as a greenfield project in 1995, and the 
Nordic owner acquired unit 2 (which itself had been established as a greenfield project ten 
years before) in 2006. Derevo was established in 1990 as a joint venture with a Russian 
partner. The Nordic owner acquired it entirely in 1995. 80 percent of its production is 
exported to European countries. Stroymaterial is a brownfield factory, established in mid 
1990s on the site of a former Soviet construction materials plant producing products of similar 
type as Stroymaterial does nowadays. Agrotehnika’s production started at rented premises in a 
special economic zone in 2006, but it moved to current site in 2010. Operating in the 
metalworking sector, it found better qualified labour and logistics position on the current site. 
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Mashina’s business concept relies besides on high-quality products, also a comprehensive 
service and supply network throughout the country. Founded in 2002, it provided a different 
type of vehicles than it does nowadays; in 2010, when it established new production in rented 
premises on a different site, it brought some of the previous labour onto the new site. 
Although Stal has operated in Russia in different premises since its establishment in 1993, 
some of the originally hired workers have followed it to the current site. Part of the production 
of standardised metal products is currently under disinvestment, part of it under re-
investment. Provod is a brownfield factory, history of which dates back to 1992. It was 
further sold to current owner in 2003. The work at the factory consists of cutting (males) and 
composition (females) of standardized products. 
 
4. LEADERSHIP STYLE AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AT THE FIRMS 
 
At Himstroy’s unit 1, a trade union established as an independent organization had 
deliberately assumed an aggressive stance against the employer, and the action of the union 
had been destructive to the company during the 2000s. The trade union in question was not 
involved in attestation of jobs, and the idea was obviously to marginalize this union for the 
favour of another union, which held a strong position at the unit 2. The union at the unit 2 was 
consulted in work organization related issues (e.g. the new pay system). There was no 
collective agreement at Himstroy, although the management was going to start a negotiation 
process. Such a partnership did not, however, bring forth any ultimate benefit for the union, 
since it was also by-passed in work-related consultation. In 2010, Himstroy's management 
initiated bimonthly / quarterly consultation meetings with those production workers who do 
not belong to trade union. In addition to this, there was an annual information event for all 
employees, which was going to be arranged quarterly. One might argue, therefore, that the 
employee-management relations at Himstroy had developed from openly adversarial to more 
co-operative. The diversified HR management strategies between the two units apparently 
derive from different sizes (unit 1 has 250 employees while unit 2 has 600) and from the 
management’s desire to define industrial relations on the shop floor to their own liking (the 
marginalization of the trade union at unit 1).  
Derevo‘s production process was undergoing modernisation during the time of the interviews, 
although it still remained highly hierarchical. The work organization was traditional; there 
were 400 employees in the production, of which 20 were supervisors. The modernization 
meant that the number of employees was slightly decreasing and the work itself was 
intensifying. There was trade union and a collective negotiation committee in operation at 
Derevo, in a manner it does in the Nordic ‘bargained constitutionalist’ environment. The 
committee consisted of five members from the management and five members from the trade 
union. A representative of the management mentioned that they had to agree with the trade 
union upon some measures, such as during the crisis they had to agree on reduced working 
hours. There was a suggestion box for the initiatives of the workers, which is however little 
used. The management organised meetings with the whole workforce occasionally, and 
further ad hoc meetings with groups of workers. Such an approach to employee relations 
resembled Nordic-type participative management, which in the Russian context is 
‘innovative’. However, the work organization itself remained bureaucratic. 
At Stroymaterial, there was besides a small trade union, also a small committee established 
not a long time ago that discussed welfare issues such as the functioning of the canteen. It 
consisted of employees, union and management representatives. The management discussed 
mainly work-related issues with the union. One example of such issue had been a change in 
working schedule in one production section. There was a collective agreement signed in the 
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factory for two years period at a time. Although wages were negotiated with the union, the 
management had the right to give individual bonuses in addition to the minimum tariffs. 
While consultation with union seems to be more or less commonplace, the union’s real room 
to negotiate on important issues such as wages appeared to be restricted. A big factory as 
Derevo and Himstroy, Stroymaterial had a rather traditional management style in place, 
accompanied by some Nordic features of participative management.  
Agrotehnika is a small investment of a Nordic company, operating in the metalworking 
sector. At the moment of the interviews, the premises underwent installations of new 
equipment, and full production was about to start in 2011 or 2012. Majority of the installation 
was carried out by the company’s own employees. Due to the move from the old premises and 
the construction of the new ones, the number of personnel at Agrotehnika was very low, only 
about 30 persons. The employment figure was about to grow steadily once the composition 
process has been set up. The production is organized around a team, which made of one shift. 
As another production process will start its operation, there will be competition between the 
production teams (one team represents one product) in terms of performance, quality, 
cleanness, safety and discipline. On the other hand, large autonomy was allowed to the teams 
in terms of work organization related budget: the teams would be provided with some 
budgetary means for their own use. The organization of work followed the ‘5S’ model, 
adopted from a West European sister unit. There was a mutual one to two hours meeting 
every week on work-related issues, where managers and employees got together. The general 
director devoted a lot of his time for the running of the production while simultaneously 
maintained a paternalist management style characteristic of such small-scale engineering 
shop. All in all, the leadership style was really ‘innovative’ against Russian and even against 
Nordic backdrop.  
Mashina’s production stages were to a high degree standardised, which left employees little 
room for improvisation or discretion. However, in the spirit of continuous improvement, 
employees' suggestions were encouraged as regards improvements in the process, work safety 
or ergonomics. The managing director gave a twenty minutes talk to all the staff every second 
week concerning the future prospects, market situation and employment situation in the 
factory. There was no trade union at the factory. As regards management style at Mashina, 
some clues can be discerned about it in the attitude toward the labour force on one hand, and 
in the managerial talk. The production manager emphasized that there is a difference in 
productivity between a Nordic production unit and Mashina, which is due to lower investment 
levels at the Russian factory. However, wages of the core workers were relatively good in the 
Russian context. Moreover, the way the managing director spoke of trust between the 
management and employees and the procedure of the recruitment process hint at some sort of 
paternalism in this factory. He insisted in the mutuality of keeping one’s promises 
(concerning both the employer and employees) and a close scrutiny of workers to be hired. In 
the process of recruiting (which was performed through a labour agency in the first place) and 
workplace learning, the ‘bad’ and unmotivated workers leave and the ‘good’ and committed 
workers remain. Although there were some signs of paternalist managerial style, in the 
Russian environment the leadership style could be characterized as ‘innovative’, which was 
mainly due to the small-step policy of investments and the small size of the factory for the 
time being.  
One of Stal’s departments, which is producing a more traditional and standardised product, 
was currently undergoing disinvestment. Another, however, was in the process of 
reinvestment, and the whole factory was subject to optimisation activities for reducing 
complexity and prices. There was no trade union neither any other employee representation 
system at Stal. However, there was an elected representative from Stal for the company's 
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European Information and Consultation Forum (EICF). In terms of management style, it was 
obvious that there are some features of paternalism at Stal, although there was a strong 
emphasis on a Nordic-type participatory management. An interviewed manager underscored 
the openness of the corporate culture, where the management tries to listen to the employees 
and to enter into dialogue with them. Involvement and commitment of workers was mainly 
sought to be reached by means of continuous improvement, which implies employee 
participation in production-related issues. For the blue-collar workers, company goals were 
not promoted by individual performance-based pay schemes but instead occasional bonuses 
and non-monetary rewards are promoted. There was an extra allowance and medical 
insurance (not very extensive) for retired workers, which is ‘means-tested’ in a way that one 
has to have completed a ten-year blameless career at the company. Such a paternalist style – 
which indeed has analogies with the Soviet labour process – would prove unsustainable in 
case the number of workers will increase and this medium-sized engineering shop will grow 
into a larger factory.  
Provod had recently introduced a quality control system where in each month, the department 
chief held personal development talks and evaluated the subordinate's performance based on a 
set of quality indicators. The goal of closer monitoring was to optimise the labour process, 
which would result in intensification of work. There was a trade union at Provod, and a 
collective agreement. The management director had a monthly meeting with the trade union 
chairperson. Also, the HR manager has daily communication with the union chair. Employee 
relations have changed from adversarial to more co-operative during latest years. For 
example, the number of the workers’ complaints to the labour inspectorate has decreased 
sharply, where the management and employee representatives have managed to resolve 
problems within the company. The trade union was more militant in the beginning stage, 
when it was established in 2003. According to a representative of management, the 
chairperson of the union sought more conflicts and not compromises with the directors. The 
collective agreement was one of the most comprehensive ones, including e.g. wage tariffs and 
grounds for bonus schemes (which is a rarity among the case study companies). One might 
conclude, therefore, that the management style at Provod was nearest to ‘bargained 
constitutionalism’. It remains to be seen, however, whether the style turns into true 
partnership or traditional style in the future.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
It was found that Nordic managers have certain latitude to choose their leadership style, 
although factory size and the scale of investment (small-scale vs. large-scale) set constraints 
for Nordic HRM in Russia. It is evidenced that especially in case of acquisitions or 
brownfield investments, there is some hold-over from the Soviet organization of work. This is 
key to whether managements opt for the ‘innovative’ or ‘bureaucratic’ leadership style. In 
factories having Soviet background in terms of human resources or location and of a larger 
size (Derevo, Himstroy, Provod and Stroymaterial), a Nordic-type ‘incorporation 
participation’ or Soviet-style ‘welfare participation’ model was more likely to be applied, 
although however more or less bureaucratic management prevails. On the other hand at 
smaller workshops (Agrotehnika, Mashina and Stal), there was a peril that innovative 
leadership turns out to resemble (also Soviet-type) paternalism. There was neither an 
occurrence of innovative leadership nor bureaucratic management among the case studies, 
which leads to a conclusion that the style adopted by Nordic managements takes rather a 
hybrid form involving both innovative and bureaucratic styles. 
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